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Online Appendix for Hirsch and Shotts, “Policy Development Mo-
nopolies: Adverse Consequences and Institutional Responses”
This online appendix contains all formal proofs, as well as analysis of an extension of a model with
alternative assumptions about bargaining. We begin by establishing a general result on optimal policy
development in our baseline model and our model of internal capacity.
Lemma 1 The developer’s optimal policy (y∗D, q
∗
D) conditional on giving utility at least s ≥ 0 for the
decisionmaker is unique, continuous in xD and s, and characterized as follows.
1. If c′D (s+ λDM (xD)) < 1, then y
∗
D = xD and q
∗
D = q0, where q0 is the unique solution to
c′D (qD) = 1.
2. If c′D (s+ λDM (xD)) ≥ 1, then y∗D is the unique ideology in [0, xD] that solves
max
yD∈[0,xD]
{(s+ λDM (yD))− λD (xD − yD)− cD (s+ λDM (yD))} ,
and q∗D = s+ λDM (y
∗
D) .
Proof. A policy yields at least s for the decisionmaker i.f.f. qD ≥ s + λDM (|yD|); call such a policy
enactable. An optimal enactable policy (y∗D, q
∗
D) thus satisfies
(y∗D, q
∗
D) ∈ arg max
(yD,qD):qD≥s+λDM (|yD|)
{qD − λD (xD − yD)− cD (qD)}
We first argue that every enactable policy outside the compact set
C (xD, s) ≡ {(yD, qD) : yD ∈ [0, xD] and qD = max {q0, s+ λDM (yD)}}
is strictly worse than some policy inside it; the developer’s maximization problem may thus be re-
stricted to this set w.l.o.g., and a maximum exists. An enactable policy (yD, qD) with yD < 0 is strictly
worse than (0, qD) for the developer which is also enactable, and likewise yD > xD is strictly worse than
(xD, qD). Finally, an optimal qD at each fixed yD ∈ [0, xD] maximizes qD − cD (qD) − λD (xD − yD)
s.t. qD ≥ s+ λDM (yD); this straightforwardly yields max {q0, s+ λDM (yD)} as the unique optimum
by the strict convexity of cD (·).
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We now characterize the optimum and show it is unique. First observe that no policy with
yD ∈ [0, xD) and qD > s+λDM (yD) can be optimal because if qD > s+λDM (yD) the developer would
be strictly better off proposing (yD + , qD) , which is enactable for sufficiently small . If condition
(1) holds (c′D (s+ λDM (xD)) < 1) then the unique optimal quality at each ideology yD ∈ [0, xD)
is qD = q0 > s + λDM (yD), but no such policy can be optimal by the preceding argument, and so
the unique optimal policy must be (xD, q0). If condition (2) holds (c
′
D (s+ λDM (xD)) ≥ 1) then the
unique optimal quality at ideology yD = xD is qD = s + λDM (yD), any optimal policy must satisfy
qD = s + λDM (yD), and thus they must solve the restated maximization problem in condition (2).
The first two term represents the quality of the proposal, the second is the developer’s ideological loss,
and the final one is her cost of developing quality. Uniqueness of y∗D then follows from the fact that
c′D > 0 and c
′′
D ≥ 0. It is interior, i.e., in (0, xD) , because λ′DM (0) = 0 and c′D (λDM (xD)) > 1.
Last observe that the developer’s problem can be written as max
(yD,qD)∈C(xD,s)
{f (yD, q;xD, s)}, where
it is easily verified that f (·) and C (·) are continuous in (xD, s). By the Theorem of the Maximum
the maximizer (y∗D, q
∗
D) (already shown to be unique) is thus continuous in (xD, s). 
Proof of Proposition 1 If the decisionmaker does not enact the developer’s policy, then the optimal
policy for him to enact is (0, 0) , which gives him utility 0. This yields the minimum level of utility,
s = 0, that the developer must offer to the decisionmaker for a policy to be enactable. The developer
must then choose both whether to develop an enactable policy, and which policy to develop if she
does so. Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal enactable policy. Moreover, the developer will always
find it weakly optimal to develop some enactable policy, since developing the enactable policy (0, 0) is
costless and yields the same utility as developing no policy.
If c′D (λDM (yD)) < 1 (equivalently xD < xˆD), the constraint of getting the decisionmaker’s ap-
proval is not binding. The developer’s optimal enactable policy is (xD, q
∗
D) from Lemma 1.1. Because
c′D (q
∗
D) = 1 and c
′
D (λDM (yD)) < 1, the developer’s policy has enough quality so that the decision-
maker strictly prefers it over (0, 0) .
If c′D (λDM (yD)) ≥ 1 (equivalently xD ≥ xˆD), the constraint of getting the decisionmaker’s ap-
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proval is binding. By Lemma 1.2, the optimal enactable policy has ideology y∗ that solves
max
yD∈[0,xD]
λDM (yD)− λD (xD − yD)− cD (λDM (yD)) .
The optimum satisfies the first order condition
c′D (λDM (yD))− 1 =
λ′D (xD − yD)
λ′DM (yD)
.
Equilibrium quality and actors’ utilities follow directly from the setup of the model.
Proof of Proposition 2 We first characterize the developer’s optimal behavior when the decision-
maker has established capacity. We say that the developer preempts when she develops a policy that
the decisionmaker is willing to enact in lieu of using his own capacity, call any such policy enactable,
and show that the developer preempts iff xD is greater than a finite cutpoint x¯D ≥ 0.
Declining to preempt results in policy outcome (0, q∗DM ) where q
∗
DM is the unique solution to
c′DM (qDM ) = 1, and yields utility q
∗
DM − λD (xD) for the developer. Alternatively, a policy (yD, qD)
is enactable i.f.f. qD − λDM (yD) ≥ s∗ where s∗ = q∗DM − cDM (q∗DM ); preempting yields a gain of
(qD − q∗DM )− cD (qD) + (λD (xD)− λD (|xD − yD|)) .
Now fix any enactable (yD, qD) with yD > 0; because λD (·) is strictly convex and limz→∞ λD (z) =∞,
the gain is strictly increasing over xD ≥ yD and approaches∞. This yields the desired result. First, for
any fixed enactable policy (yD, qD) some sufficiently extreme developer strictly prefers to preempt with
it (but may optimally preempt with something else). Second, if a developer xD optimally preempts
with (y∗D, q
∗
D) (with y
∗
D ∈ (0, xD] by Lemma 1), then any developer x′D > xD also strictly prefers to
preempt with that same policy (but may optimally preempt with something else).
Last we characterize the decisionmaker’s cost cutpoint k (xD) for establishing internal capacity and
make observations about equilibrium behavior. From Proposition 1 the decisionmaker’s utility absent
capacity is max {q0 − λDM (xD) , 0}. Applying the preceding analysis and Lemma 1 the decision-
maker’s utility after establishing capacity is s∗ if xD ≤ x¯D (since the developer will not preempt) and
max {q0 − λDM (xD) , s∗} otherwise (since the developer will optimally preempt, and the constraint
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of gaining the decisionmaker’s approval may or may not be binding). Comparing the decisionmaker’s
utility with and without capacity we see that it is optimal to establish capacity iff
k ≤ k (xD) ≡
 s
∗ −max {q0 − λDM (xD) , 0} if xD < x¯D
max {q0 − λDM (xD) , s∗} −max {q0 − λDM (xD) , 0} otherwise
.
It is easily verified that a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing capacity to ever be optimal
(k (xD) > 0) is that s
∗ > q0 − λDM (xD), i.e., that the preemption constraint is binding. For such
values of xD the cutpoint reduces to k (xD) = s
∗ −max {q0 − λDM (xD) , 0}, the developer’s optimal
preemption policy y∗preempt (xD) leaves the decisionmaker with utility exactly equal to s∗, and it is as
characterized in Lemma 1.2.
As an aside, before moving on to our next result we briefly make two additional observations. First,
note that k (xD) < 0 for any xD ≥ x¯D such that s∗ < q0 − λDM (xD), reflecting the fact that internal
capacity may induce free-riding. Second, for values of xD such that s
∗ > q0−λDM (xD) , the cutpoint
k (xD) is monotonically increasing, implying that for k ∈ (0, s∗) the decisionmaker establishes internal
capacity i.f.f. the developer is sufficiently extreme.
Proof of Proposition 3 The fact that the decisionmaker establishes capacity at cost k2 but not at
cost k1, and strictly benefits from doing so, follows immediately from k1 < k (xD) < k2.
We now characterize when the developer benefits from the decisionmaker’s capacity. The devel-
oper’s utility absent capacity is max
qD≥λDM (|yD|)
{f (yD, qD)} where f (yD, qD) = qD − λD (|xD − yD|) −
cD (qD). Her utility with capacity is
max
{
max
qD≥s∗+λDM (|yD|)
{f (yD, qD)} , q∗DM − λD (xD)
}
.
Clearly max
qD≥λDM (|yD|)
{f (yD, qD)} ≥ max
qD≥s∗+λDM (|yD|)
{f (yD, qD)} (the latter is the developer’s utility
from optimal preemption), since the latter maximizes f (yD, qD) over a strictly smaller set. For the
developer to benefit thus requires that xD < x¯D (the developer does not preempt), and she benefits
i.f.f. (q∗DM − λD (xD))− max
qD≥λDM (|yD|)
{f (yD, qD)} ≥ 0.
We now argue that the set of developers who benefit is described by a cutpoint xˇD. A developer
with xD would optimally develop (y
∗
D, q
∗
D) with q
∗
D ≥ λDM (|y∗D|) and y∗D ∈ [0, xD] if the decisionmaker
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lacks capacity, and is therefore harmed by capacity i.f.f.
(q∗D − q∗DM )− cD (q∗D) + (λD (xD)− λD (xD − y∗D)) > 0.
By the convexity of λD (·), any developer with x′D > xD strictly prefers the decisionmaker lacking
capacity and developing (y∗D, q
∗
D) to the decisionmaker having capacity (but will optimally develop
something else absent capacity), and is therefore also harmed by capacity. 
As an aside, from the proof of Proposition 2, for the decisionmaker to ever establish capacity
requires k (xD) > 0 ⇐⇒ s∗ > q0 − λDM (xD). The set of developers who might benefit from a
decrease in decisionmaker’s capacity costs is thus nonempty i.f.f. xˆcD < xˇD, where s
∗ = q0−λDM (xˆcD).
Proof of Proposition 4 The main text provides most of the argument, which we retrace here,
adding a few details. Given an agent with ideal point xA < xD, by the same reasoning as in Lemma
1 the developer doesn’t want to develop an enactable proposal yD < xA or yD > xD, and for yD ∈
[xA, xD] quality must be qD = (yD − xA)2 for an optimal enactable proposal.1 This holds with equality
∀xD, due to the linear cost cD (q) = αDq. The developer’s optimal bill solves
max
yD∈[xA,xD]
(yD − xA)2 − (xD − yD)2 − αD (yD − xA)2 .
The first order condition for yD is
2yD − 2xA − 2yD + 2xD − 2αDyD + 2αDxA = 0
so
y∗D (xA) =
1
αD
xD +
(
1− 1
αD
)
xA and q
∗
D (xA) = (yD − xA)2 =
(
xD − xA
αD
)2
. (1)
The decisionmaker’s utility is
s∗ (xA) ≡ q∗D (xA)− (y∗D (xA)− 0)2 =
(
2
αD
− 1
)
x2A −
2xAxD
αD
.
For Part 1 of the proposition, note that the first order condition for xA is
2
(
2
αD
− 1
)
xA − 2xD
αD
= 0
x∗A = −
xD
αD − 2 .
1For xA > xD the analysis is similar. The decisionmaker would never delegate to such an agent.
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For Part 2 of the proposition, we substitute into Equation 1 to get the equilibrium ideology and quality:
y∗agent = y
∗
D (x
∗
A) =
1
αD
xD +
(
1− 1
αD
)
x∗A = −
xD
αD (αD − 2)
and
q∗agent = q
∗
D (x
∗
A) =
(
xD − x∗A
αD
)2
=
x2D
α2D
(
αD − 1
αD − 2
)2
.
For Part 3 of the Proposition, decisionmaker utility is
− (y∗D (x∗A))2 + q∗D (x∗A) = −
x2D
α2D
(
1
αD − 2
)2
+
x2D
α2D
(
αD − 1
αD − 2
)2
=
x2D
αD (αD − 2) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5 The competitive model is a special case of Hirsch (2015), henceforth
referred to as H. In that paper several results are stated in terms of the players’ “engagement” in the
contest, defined in H Proposition 2 for a player i to be i =
(
αi
αi−1
)|xi|
. Section 6 also considers the
special case of a “dominant” player k, defined as |xk| ≥ |x−k| and αk ≤ α−k with at least one strict.
In the present paper it is clear that the developer is always weakly more engaged in the contest, and
when αD < αC she is dominant in the aforementioned sense.
Part 1. H Corollary 3.1 implies that the developer always develops a proposal. That her proposals are
more moderate with competition follows from properties of equilibrium restated here; the developer
produces a policy with score s < s¯ with probability 1, the optimal ideology at each such score is
FC (s) · xDαD by H Lemma 1, and at each such score there is strictly positive probability the competitor
produces a higher-score policy (FC (s) < 1).
Part 2. Hirsch and Shotts (2015) Proposition 1 establishes that if αC = αD, the two actors use
identical (symmetric) mixed strategies. Each wins with probability 1/2 due to symmetry.
Part 3. Results follow from H Corollary 6 describing the special case when one player (here the
developer) is dominant. The corollary states that the dominant player is “score dominant,” meaning
that FD (s) < FC (s) ∀s ∈ [0, s¯). This implies both that FC (0) > 0 (i.e. the competitor sometimes sits
out), and that the developer wins the contest (i.e. develops a higher score policy) with probability > 12 .
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The corollary also states that the dominant player develops first-order stochastically more extreme
policies. It is not directly stated that she also develops first-order stochastically higher quality policies,
but this follows from a nearly identical argument as made therein about her greater extremism; a
dominant player develops higher-quality policies at every score s, i.e., q−k (s) = s +
(∣∣y∗−k (s)∣∣)2 =
s+
(∣∣∣ x−kα−k ∣∣∣Fk (s))2 > s+ (∣∣∣ xkαk ∣∣∣F−k (s))2 = s+ (|y∗k (s)|)2 = qk (s) ∀s, which yields the desired result
when combined with her score dominance.
Part 4. The decisionmaker’s utility under monopoly is 0; with competition the developer always
develops a strictly positive score (i.e. utility) proposal (see Part 1). The expression for the decision-
maker’s utility is in H Proposition 4.3. The developer’s utility is −
(
1− 1αD
)
x2D − (αD − 1) s¯ (see H
Proposition 4.2); it is easily verified that first term is just the developer’s utility under monopoly, and
the second term is strictly negative since s¯ > 0. 
Extension With Alternative Assumptions About Bargaining
Here we consider a version of the model in which the decisionmaker has more bargaining power.
Specifically, we assume that the decisionmaker can commit ex-ante to the set of policies he will accept
(denoted A) and those he will reject (everything outside A). Importantly, in the event of rejection
we assume that the decisionmaker must then make an optimal choice from the remaining policies – he
cannot commit ex-ante to implement something other than his best outside option. (This prevents the
decisionmaker from being able to extract unbounded amounts of quality by threatening to otherwise
enact a policy that is unboundedly extreme).
It is straightforward to see that strategies in which the decisionmaker commits to only accept
policies that yield utility at least s ≥ 0 will include an optimal one. Suppose some arbitrary acceptance
set A results in the developer producing (yˆD, qˆD) yielding utility sˆ – should the decisionmaker instead
simply demand utility at least sˆ the developer will optimally develop something at least this good since
(yˆD, qˆD) remains in the decisionmaker’s acceptance set. We shall henceforth refer to such a strategy
by the decisionmaker as “demanding (at least) s” and say that a demand is acceptable if it is weakly
optimal for the developer to produce a policy meeting the demand in response. In order to leverage
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our existing analysis we consider strategies of this form.2
Note that for the purposes of exposition in the main text, we discuss strategies of the form
A = {{yD, qD}}; that is, of demanding a specific policy. Naturally, demanding the exact policy that
the developer would optimally produce in response to a utility demand of at least s will yield the same
outcome as demanding the utility level.
General Analysis for All Model Variants
To keep the analysis simple and unified across model variants, we henceforth assume that all actors
have quadratic preferences, and the developer’s cost function is linear: cD (q) = αDq. Applying Lemma
1, the developer’s optimal policy (y∗D, q
∗
D) conditional on meeting a demand s satisfies
arg max
yD∈[0,xD]
{
− (xD − yD)2 − (αD − 1)
(
s+ (yD − xDM )2
)}
,
It is straightforward to show that y∗D =
(
1− 1αD
)
xDM +
(
1
αD
)
xD for any s and q
∗
D (s) = s +
(y∗D − xDM )2. In words, given linear costs and preferences, the best way for the developer to meet
any positive demand is to meet it with equality, using the same ideology regardless of the demand,
and producing just enough quality to meet the demand.3 Substituting the optimum into the objective
function, the developer’s utility from optimally meeting a demand of s is:
− (xD − xDM )2
(
1− 1
αD
)
− (αD − 1) s (2)
Now let uDMD denote the developer’s utility from what the decisionmaker will implement if she
rejects the decisionmaker’s demand. The developer will optimally accept the demand by producing
the optimal policy to meet it i.f.f. her utility from doing so (in equation 2) is at least as high as her
utility from “declining” (uDMD ). Since equation 2 is strictly (linearly) decreasing in s, the optimal
2Functionally the game resembles a Romer and Rosenthal (1978) agenda setting game in which the
decisionmaker makes offers of what the developer will produce, and the “status quo” is the best policy
the decisionmaker can achieve on his own.
3If cost were quadratic, the optimal ideology to meet the demand would move closer to the DM
with higher demands.
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acceptable demand smax for the decisionmaker to make is therefore the unique value satisfying this
constraint with equality, i.e.,
smax = − u
DM
D
αD − 1 −
(xD − xDM )2
αD
(3)
Baseline
In the baseline model, the decisionmaker must implement (xDM , 0) if he rejects the developer’s policy,
so uDMD = − (xD − xDM )2. The optimal acceptable demand is then
smax =
(xD − xDM )2
αD (αD − 1) > 0. (4)
This is clearly better than making an unacceptable demand which yields 0; therefore smax is the
optimal demand. Note that in contrast to Proposition 1 in the main text, a more extreme or skilled
developer is good for the decisionmaker, because he can extract benefits using his commitment power.
Internal Capacity
We argue that in this variant of the model the decisionmaker will only invest in and use internal
capacity if he intends not to make an acceptable demand. Intuitively, the argument is that establishing
internal capacity weakens his bargaining power vis a vis the developer by effectively improving the
“status quo” for both of them. The decisionmaker will thus establish (and use) internal capacity
i.f.f. s∗ − k ≥ (xD−xDM )2αD(αD−1) , where the values on the l.h.s. are as characterized in the main paper,
and the r.h.s. is the decisionmaker’s utility in Equation 4 from making an optimal demand without
internal capacity. When he establishes internal capacity, an optimal strategy for the decisionmaker is
to commit to reject everything and use his capacity.
This argument depends on the particulars of the game sequence, which is assumed to be as follows.
[1] The decisionmaker decides whether to establish capacity. [2] The decisionmaker announces and
commits to an acceptance set A. [3] If the developer produces something in A it is automatically
implemented; if she doesn’t, the decisionmaker moves again. [4] The decisionmaker chooses the best
policy for himself (including one he now develops) other than the developer’s policy, which he has
committed to reject.
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Consider a strategy profile in which the decisionmaker establishes internal capacity at cost k.
Should the gameplay proceed with the decisionmaker making no demand or the developer rejecting
his demand, the decisionmaker will create and implement a policy at ideological location 0 with quality
q∗DM such that c
′
DM (q
∗
DM ) = 1, as in Proposition 2.2 in the main paper. This yields utility s
∗ for the
decisionmaker and uDMD = − (xD − xDM )2 + q∗DM for the developer.
It is now straightforward to see that the decisionmaker is strictly better off having no internal
capacity and making the optimal acceptable demand rather than establishing capacity and making
the optimal acceptable demand; establishing capacity only affects smax by increasing uDMD , and in-
creasing uDMD decreases s
max (see equation 3). We may thus restrict attention to the strategy of either
establishing internal capacity and making no demand, or not establishing internal capacity and mak-
ing the optimal acceptable demand. This yields the desired result, i.e., that the decisionmaker never
establishes capacity with the goal of inducing the developer to develop a better policy.
Delegation
The delegation game closely parallels the baseline model. In the delegation game, a decisionmaker
with ideal point at xDM = 0 chooses an agent with ideal point xA ∈ R to act as the decisionmaker in
his place. Since the agent A plays the same role as the decisionmaker in the baseline model, the agent
will optimally demand utility for himself equal to smaxA =
(xD−xA)2
αD(αD−1) , and the resulting policy will be
y∗D =
(
1− 1αD
)
xA +
(
1
αD
)
xD. The original decisionmaker’s utility from this outcome is then:
− (xDM − y∗D)2 +
(
smaxA + (xA − y∗D)2
)
= −
(
1− 1
αD
)
x2A −
2xAxD
αD
+
(xD − xA)2
αD (αD − 1) .
This is therefore his objective function when choosing xA. Compared to our main delegation game
(main text equation 3), the first two terms are identical while the third term is the extra benefit from
fact that the agent uses his partial commitment power to extract more quality from the developer.
Now observe that the optimal agent is < 0, i.e., counterbalancing is optimal. To see this consider
xA > 0; then an agent at −xA yields an identical first term, a strictly positive second term, and a
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strictly larger third term (since he is further from xD > 0). Next observe that the decisionmaker
always prefers an agent strictly to the left of the one in Proposition 4.1, since the derivative of the
new third term w.r.t. xA is < 0 when xA < 0 < xD. To characterize the optimum we now take the
derivative w.r.t. xA, which yields:
−
(
1− 2
αD
)
xA − xD
αD
− xD − xA
αD (αD − 1) .
Note that this is linear in xA. Setting equal to 0 and solving for xA yields the (sometimes well defined)
optimum:
x∗A = −xD
(
αD
(αD − 2) (αD − 1)− 1
)
. (5)
When (αD − 2) (αD − 1) ≤ 1 (αD ≤≈ 2.62) and the denominator is not strictly positive, it is straight-
forward to verify that the derivative is strictly decreasing ∀xA < 0, implying that the optimal agent
is unboundedly negative. Otherwise the optimal agent is as written in Equation 5. In either case it is
easy to verify that the decisionmaker prefers an agent strictly to the left of − xDαD−2 (the optimal agent
from Proposition 4.1 for our main model), and when finite the optimal agent ideal point satisfies the
same comparative statics.
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